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    This is a collective statement on behalf of SHA bringing together public health evidence and other opinions on a key Covid policy issue.

    The impact of the pandemic on inequalities more generally and the implications for policy and plans going forward

    Key messages

    • The pandemic has hit us when we have already seen health inequities widen
      • 10 years of austerity have disproportionately affected the least affluent and the most vulnerable
      • Life expectancy has plateaued and inequalities in mortality have widened in recent years. The gap in healthy life expectancy at birth is about 19 years for both males and females.
      • Spending constraints between 2010 and 2014 were associated with an estimated 45,000 more deaths than expected: those aged >60 and in care homes accounted for the majority
      • There has been a systematic attack on the social safety net. Services have been cut disproportionately in more deprived areas with a clear North South divide, and there are higher rates of poverty in the Devolved Administrations who have limited powers to mitigate the impact of poverty. Child poverty has increased to over 4 million children
    • The COVID19 pandemic is having major impacts on health, through direct and indirect effects, summarised the in diagram below

    Source: Douglas et all, BMJ April 2020

    • The pandemic strategies are not clear across the UK and do not adequately recognise the unequal direct and indirect impacts.
      • The epidemic is at different stages in different communities and has caused more deaths in dense urban and more deprived areas.
      • It can be seen as multiple outbreaks. These are affecting the most vulnerable people inequitably, such as those in institutional settings, prisons and migrant detention facilities, homes with multiple occupancy, and households that are overcrowded or contain multiple generations.
      • A policy of managing the virus rather than aiming for suppression, may result in repeated surges, local outbreaks and lockdowns which could exacerbate the impact on health and further widen health inequities
      • The centralisation of data and decision-making has meant that approaches cannot be matched to the needs that only the regional and local level will know well enough and in real time
    • There is a consensus that the COVID19 pandemic has a major potential to widen health inequities,
      • As can be seen from the diagram above, the health impacts are likely to have differential effects on different groups of people, in particular:
        • Those most vulnerable to the infection: such as older people, BAME people, those living in enclosed settings
        • Those on low incomes or living with financial insecurity
        • Vulnerable families: for example, those at risk of domestic violence, those who are poorly housed, children at risk of abuse or neglect
        • Those at risk of social isolation
        • Vulnerable groups: for example, the homeless, people with disabilities, undocumented migrants
        • High vulnerability and institutional settings where outbreaks can occur rapidly.
        • This pandemic has made us focus on older people, and the young are paying a high price for protecting the old. Impacts on the young will have more long-lasting impacts on health inequities
        • Inadequate public health expenditure and ‘shrinking the state’ disproportionately affect poorer people including our BAME communities. More ‘austerity’ to ‘pay for’ the pandemic is not an option as austerity widens the health inequalities that lead to disproportionate mortality due to direct and indirect impacts of COIVD19
    • Deprivation: people living in more deprived areas are more likely to die from COVID19
      •  ONS analyses have shown that the age-standardised mortality rate of deaths involving COVID-19 in the most deprived areas of England was 55.1 deaths per 100,000 population compared with 25.3 deaths per 100,000 population in the least deprived areas. In Wales, the most deprived areas had a mortality rate for deaths involving COVID-19 of 44.6 deaths per 100,000 population, almost twice as high as the least deprived area of 23.2 deaths per 100,000 population.
      • The Kings College Symptoms tracker found that COVID-19 prevalence and severity became rapidly distributed across the UK within a month of the WHO declaration of the pandemic, with significant evidence of urban hot-spots, which tend to be more deprived areas.
      • The openSAFELY cohort study used national primary care electronic health record data linked to in-hospital COVID-19 death data, which is the largest cohort study in the world, examining 17 million primary care records. This showed a gradient from least deprived to most deprived, adjusted for age, sex and risk factors, so that people living in the most deprived quintile have a risk of 1.75 that of people in the least deprived

    Hazard ratio for in hospital COVID19 death (adjusted for age/sex/risk factors

    IMD quintile of deprivation
    • Unequal impacts
      • People living in more deprived areas are more likely to be exposed to COVID19:
        • Population density and overcrowding: urban poverty
        • Occupational exposure: more likely to be key workers and less likely to be able to work from home
        • Vulnerable groups e.g. homeless, refugees and asylum seekers, substance misusers
      • People living in more deprived areas are more likely to die when they get sick with COVID19:
        • They develop multiple co-morbidities at younger age (people in the most deprived areas get sick 10 years younger than the most affluent)
        • Equity of access to quality health and social care mitigates this, but has become eroded as austerity has hit services in the poorest areas most
        • They are more likely to also be from BAME groups
    • We have evidence on what works to reduce inequities in health
      • We know what causes inequities in health outcomes. The WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health in states that inequities are caused by the conditions in which we are born, grown, work and live. There is now a large body of evidence from expert reports on health inequalities from academic as well as government sponsored reviews (Black and Acheson) for the past 40 years.
      • We know what works to tackle inequities in health: this can be usefully summarised by Sir Michael Marmot’s six policy areas for action:
        • Give every child the best start in life
        • Enable all children, young people and adults to maximise their capabilities and have control over their lives
        • Create fair employment and good work for all
        • Ensure healthy standard of living for all
        • Create and develop healthy and sustainable places and communities
        • Strengthen the role and impact of ill-health prevention
      • No strategy: the UK government has not prioritised health inequalities, and England has had no health inequalities strategy since 2010, although devolved nations have policies within the constraints of their powers.
      • But we have assets: We have seen how individuals and communities are resilient, and this has been amply demonstrated in their amazing response to this public health crisis. We should be following Prof Sir Michael Marmot’s advice: “Our vision is of creating conditions for individuals to take control of their own lives. For some communities this will mean removing structural barriers to participation, for others facilitating and developing capacity and capability through personal and community development”

    Conclusions:

    1. There are already major inequities in health outcomes in the UK, and these have been getting worse
    2. COIVD19 is disproportionately killing the less affluent and those in vulnerable groups
    3. There is a very high risk that the indirect impact of COVID19 will worsen health inequities through well-known mechanisms.
      • Greater vulnerabilities: for example, the higher prevalence of co-morbidities and complex multi-morbidities, ethnicity, disability
      • Higher exposure: for example, through occupations, overcrowding, enclosed settings, multi-occupancy households
      • Less access to resources to protect against economic and financial impacts
      • Less access to quality public services

    Actions

    • Commit to a long-term inequalities’ strategy with a multi-faceted approach building on previous Labour success 1997-2010. This should be even more ambitious, to tackle the commercial/ structural determinants of health, and to create healthy communities and places: it should reduce reliance on less effective individual behaviour change strategies, and include the intersectionality of disadvantage
    • Decentralise data and decision-making for COVID19 to better allow resources and control measures to be matched to need
    • Focus on elimination of transmission of COVID19 high risk settings, for example social care and health service facilities, prisons and migrant detention facilities, homes with multiple occupancy, and overcrowded or intergenerational households
    • Redistribute wealth: Maintain social protection measures as long as required and then in the longer term: implement Universal Basic Income and a Green New Deal with an economy based on need not profit. Ensure proportionate universal allocation of resources o Prioritise children: ensure safeguarding/ tackle domestic violence/ prevent unwanted pregnancies/ action to ensure healthy pregnancy outcomes/ push for childhood vaccinations programs to continue/ get children back to school as safely as possible
    • The NHS and social care should be always provided by need and not ability to pay: the state is a protective factor against unequal exposures to health determinants, as a provider, enabler and employer
    • Build and nurture the grassroots movements that have blossomed during the pandemic, and establish community oriented primary care to empower communities to create healthy communities

    Sources

    • Watkins J, Wulaningsih W, Da Zhou C, et al Effects of health and social care spending constraints on mortality in England: a time trend analysis BMJ Open 2017;7:e017722. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2017-017722
    • https://bmjopen.bmj.eom/content/7/11/e017722

    Posted by Brian Fisher on behalf of the Policy Team.

    Comments Off on Briefing Topic 2 – Inequalities

    The SHA has been publishing its COVID-19 Blogs weekly since the 15th March. A number of themes have cropped up consistently throughout as actual events have occurred.

    Too slow to act

    The slow and dithering response by the government has been one such theme. This has been exposed with embarrassing clarity by media investigative teams which this weekend include the Insight team. Their detailed report on the dither and delay leading up to lockdown showed that when Italy and Spain locked down on the 10th and 13th March respectively each had over a million estimated infections in their countries. In the UK we had looked aghast at the footage from Lombardy and Madrid as their health and care system was visibly overwhelmed but the government failed to heed their strictly enforced lockdown policies in the 2 weeks warning we had. During this time from the 8th March the Johnson administration allowed the Five Nations rugby matches to go ahead in Twickenham and Edinburgh, the Cheltenham races, the Liverpool/Atletico Madrid football match on the 11th March and two Stereophonics pop concerts in Cardiff held on the 14th and 15th March. All this was apparently following the science…..

    France locked down on the 16th March with an estimated 800,000 infections and Germany locked down on the 21st March with only 270,000. The Johnson government had resisted calls to lockdown at the same time as France on the 16th March. They waited until the 23rd March by which time the estimated number of infections in the community had almost doubled to 1.5m. This dither and delay lies at the heart of our comparatively poor outcome with the COVID-19 confirmed deaths of 37,000 (an underestimate of all excess deaths). This list includes at least 300 NHS and care workers.

    Protect the NHS

    Germany’s earlier decision has reaped benefits alongside their border closure, effective test, trace and isolate (TTI) policies, with sufficient testing capacity, and led by regional public health organisations. They also have sufficient ITU/hospital bed capacity without the need to build new Nightingale Hospitals. Our government did not close borders or introduce quarantining on entry, and turned out not to have used February to build our testing capacity either.

    The strategic attention in the UK has been to ‘Protect the NHS’ but not in the same way Care Homes. Because of the shortage of testing capacity we had to stop the community based test, track and isolate (TTI) programme. The NHS has stood up well through the dedication of its staff and demonstrated the superiority of a nationalised health system. However from a public health policy perspective the COBR meetings should have been thinking about the whole population and what populations were at high risk such as those in residential and care homes.

    The data in Wuhan had been published quickly and had shown that it was older people who are most at risk of disease and death. We knew all this, the Chinese data has been replicated in Europe but the Government failed to follow through.

    The Privately owned Social Care sector

    Unlike the NHS hospital sector, the care sector, of residential and nursing homes,  are a patchwork of large ‘private for profit’ owners, smaller privately owned and run homes and the charitable sector. There is a registration system and some quality assurance through the Care Quality Commission (CQC). The fact that we do not have a National Care Service along the lines of the NHS has led to operational problems during the pandemic between commissioners, regulators, owners and the staff who run the homes. As privately run establishments there were varied expectations about procuring PPE for the staff in the early phase of the pandemic response. There was also a lack of clarity about whether satisfactory infection prevention and control procedures were in place and able to deal with COVID-19. How had residential and care homes undertaken risk assessments, working out how to cohort residents with symptoms and manage their care? What about staffing problems, agency staff and policies for symptomatic staff to self isolate? It was important early on to consider in what respect COVID-19 is the same as or different from influenza or a norovirus outbreak,

    It seems that the Secretary of State for Health and his staff have been too slow in aligning Public Health England (PHE), GPs and primary care infection control nurses alongside the homes to provide more expert advice and support on infection prevention and control.  It seems also that some nursing homes took patients discharged from the NHS who were still infected with COVID-19, when on the 19th March the Department of Health announced that 15,000 people should be discharged to free up NHS beds. There was no mandatory testing or period of quarantining before these patients were discharged. In this way hospital based infections were transferred to nursing homes.

    The scarcity of PPE (caused by the Government’s failure to heed the results of Exercise Cygnus) meant that professionals felt nervous about entering homes to assess sick residents and sadly to be able to certify death and certificate the cause of death. Rationing of PPE in this sector has contributed to the risk of infection in care staff, which would cause transmission in the care home. Most homes had to lockdown too, stopping visiting and in some cases having staff move into the home themselves at personal risk and disruption to their lives. It became clear that transmission from the community to care home residents was occurring through staff. This has been very hard on these undervalued and low paid staff, who began to realise that they were transmitting infection between residents or from themselves.

    Some of the stories of care staff’s heroism and dedication to their residents is extraordinary. It is reminiscent of Camus’s book The Plague, which recounts heroism undertaken by ordinary people doing extraordinary things. Tellingly Camus also suggests that the hardest part of a crisis is not working out the right thing to do, but rather having the guts to get on and do it. Many care home managers and staff had to do just that.

    Follow the money

    A recent report looked at HC-One, which is Britain’s largest care home group with 328 homes, 17,000 residents and so far 700 COVID related deaths. The operating profits of the company are of the order of £57m but, through the financial arrangements with off shore related companies, the profits “disappear” in £50m ‘interest payments’. While global interest rates have been at historically low levels HC-One have apparently been paying 9% interest on a Cayman island loan of £11.4m and 15-18% interest on another Cayman company for a £89m loan. Apparently HC-One paid only £1m in tax to the HMRC last year (Private Eye 22nd May) through this transaction with off shore interests off-setting their profit. This is not however inhibiting them from seeking government support at this time. A better future would be to rescue social care by nationalising the social care sector, bring the staff into more secure terms and conditions of service and sort out the property compensation over time through transparent district valuations.

    Test, trace and isolate (TTI)

    At long last the government has signalled that it wishes to reactivate the community based test, trace and isolate programme that it stood down over 10 weeks ago. Of course, once the virus had been allowed to spread widely within communities, the TTI programme would have had to modify their objectives from the outbreak control of the early stages. However they could have continued to build the local surveillance picture within their communities, help PHE to control residential and nursing home outbreaks with their community based contacts and prepare for the next phase of continuing control measures during the recovery phase.

    They seem to have at last realised the potential of local Directors of Public Health (DsPH) who are embedded in local government and who, after all, lead Local Resilience Fora as part of the framework of a national emergency plan. The DsPH have links to the Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) who survived the austerity cuts. EHOs are experienced contact tracers well able to recruit and train new staff locally to do the job. This is in sharp contrast to the inexperienced staff now being recruited and used by the private sector.

    The local public health teams also work closely with PHE and NHS partners and so can fulfil the complex multiagency leadership required in such a public health emergency. Building on these strengths is far better than drawing on private sector consultants such as Deloittes, or companies such as SERCO, Sodexo, Compass or Mitie. All these private sector groups have an interest in hiving off parts of the public sector. In addition, unsurprisingly, they have close ties to the government and Conservative Party. Baroness Harding, who has been brought in to Chair the TTI programme, is a Tory peer married to a Tory MP who was CEO of Talk Talk. She was in charge at the time of the 2015 data breach leading to 4m customers having their bank and account details hacked. No surprises, then, that she is asked to undertake this role as a safe pair of hands in much the same way that Tory peer Lord Deighton has been asked to lead the PPE work.

    Game changers – and what is the game?

    In last week’s Blog we mentioned that Government Ministers seem to be fixated on game changers whether novel tests, treatments, vaccines or digital apps. We mentioned last week that treatments like Chloroquine need proper evaluation to see if they are safe and effective. A report in the Lancet on the 22nd May found that there was no benefit. Indeed the study found that the treatments reduced in-hospital survival and an increase in heart arrhythmias was observed when used for treating COVID-19

    Vaccines need to be researched, as they may well be important in the future but remember that a 2013 review from the Netherlands found that they take – on average – 10.71 years to develop, and had a 6% success rate from start to finish.

    The mobile apps trial in the Isle of Wight seems not to have delivered a reliable platform, and of course the Government has probably ignored the apps working splendidly in South Korea and Singapore. Meanwhile Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Faculty and Amazon stand ready to move in. There are major risks with getting into bed with some of these players including the data mining company Palantir.

    Palantir

    This company was initially funded by the CIA but has secured lucrative public sector contracts in the USA covering predictive policing, migrant surveillance and battlefield software. These IT and data companies have been drawn into the UK COVID-19 ‘data store’. While working alongside NHSX and its digital transformation unit wanting to assess and predict demand there are concerns over data privacy, accountability and the possible impact on the NHS.

    Palantir has been of interest to Dominic Cummings (DC) since 2015, according to the New Statesman, when he reportedly told the Cambridge Analytica whistleblower, that he wanted to build the ‘Palantir of politics’. The other company Faculty had close ties too with the Vote leave campaign. Cummings is said to want to remould the state in the image of Silicon Valley.

    Conclusion

    So in the turmoil of the COVID-19 response the government has looked to multiple game changers while ignoring straightforward tried and tested communicable disease control measures. It has succeeded in ‘Protecting the NHS’ (though not against the incursion of the private sector) but allowed the residential and care home sector to be exposed to infection. We welcome the belated return to supporting DsPH and local public health leadership, which has been left out for too long. Let us hope – and demand – that there is also more investment in public health services and not allow Government spokespeople to start to blame organisations such as PHE.

    We worry that they are not being alert to safeguard public services by inviting some dubious partners to the top table. On the contrary they are VERY alert – to the opportunity of inserting private capital (and profit) in the NHS and other public sector organisations. One such company new to many of us is the data mining company Palantir – a company named after an all-seeing crystal ball in JRR Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings. Lurking in the background is of course the Prime Minister’s senior political adviser DC.

    24th May 2020

    Posted by Jean Hardiman Smith on behalf of the Officers and Vice Chairs of the SHA.

    2 Comments

    The crises in health and social care are rightly at the forefront of people’s anger about the government’s lack of preparation for an inevitable pandemic, as we now face with Covid-19. People are dying unnecessarily. An integral element, simmering under the surface, is the fragmentation of public health nutrition services that should provide food security within our communities so vulnerable people are kept in good nutritional status. Yet even before this crisis there was an estimated 3 million malnourished people, with an aging population this will increase, and 8 million people in food insecurity. As lockdowns began, research from the Food Foundation estimated 3 million households were already experiencing hunger. Inequalities underpin the right to life in this crisis: mortality rates for people living in deprived areas are double that for those in less deprived areas, and interlocks with ethnicity. Some highlight ‘obesity’ but is not the problem food and health inequalities? Poverty underpins people’s lack of access to foods of good nutritional quality. Rising poverty levels are driven by erosion of welfare state and neoliberal restructuring of our economy through deregulation, precarity and low pay. Child poverty has increased by 100, 000 over the past year with around 30% of all children living in poverty. Food poverty is increasing and requires structural change not short term solutions. To protect child health and meaningfully tackle poverty a host of fiscal steps are urgently required to enable families to buy food, such as basic living income and immediate action to increase welfare. This does not remove the need for a food security system that ensures a basic level of socially acceptable nutrition is available for all; that includes universal free school meals and hot meals for older people. Public health nutrition is more than just food. It’s about ‘social’ nutrition: the infrastructure of community resources that enable people to eat together and to collectively care.

    The networks of care within our communities have broken down as the infrastructure providing services and civil spaces have closed. There is little research that documents how the spending cuts and restructuring within public health has impacted public health nutrition. However, research is underway that aims to inform the inevitable public enquiry on Covid-19. As socialists, we need to go further and give a call to action to stop further privatisation and charitisation of PHN. Fundamentally, the interests of private industry and charity conflict with the welfare state. Despite the altruism of many involved, these organisations cannot meet current or future needs which will increase in the looming economic depression. They cannot enable the voices of those who are suffering in our communities.

    Privatisation of PHN began under New Labour as food companies were brought into public health policy. From the 2000s non-NHS providers entered PHN. Local government spending cuts and austerity hit prevention budgets including nutrition-based, child weight management and life style interventions. Cuts to nutrition-related services are broadly felt because nutritional health is cross-departmental involving education, community engagement, adult and children and young people’s services and a range of professions including health visiting. Nutrition was embedded in the Sure Start programme. Since 2010, 1000 children centres have closed as £1 billion has been cut from budgets. The number of community centres, lunch clubs and meals on wheels for the elderly has been decimated. In this crisis, the role of schools in feeding children has shown their centrality in community life. Yet there are barriers due to privatisation that limit a strategic approach. For example, in most neighbourhoods, schools have the only industrial kitchens capable of preparing and distributing foods to large numbers of people. Yet access to these is mostly controlled by private food companies, including multinationals, that hold the catering contracts. So, in many ways communities are isolated, disconnected from power and the resources to enable local solutions. Social theorists argue that ‘austerity localism’ brought cuts, disempowered local communities creating distrust and disconnect with local government. Community involvement is further limited by democratic deficits that are created by material constraints and lack of structural mechanisms. All this suggests that it will be harder for public health to connect with communities and understand the scale of their need. While not supporting the authoritarian Chinese State, community engagement was integral to the Chinese response.

    Responsibility for public health nutrition lies with local government who have enlisted third sector organisations (TSOs), social entrepreneurs, and food industry to construct the state’s food aid response in this emergency. From a dietetic standpoint, it is concerning that food banks can distribute foods that may unintentionally cause harm. For example, food banks only need warn of potential allergens, if they are set up as a business.  Food banks can distribute infant formula. This is risky  for example, for vulnerable families with complex needs and should not be the responsibility of food banks. It suggests a lack of a cross-departmental strategic approach that links with professionals such as nutritionists and health visiting teams.  Providing food at the general level of need is also problematic. The voluntary sector has strategic limitations in its ability to scale up according to need. In London, developing a strategic approach has been spearheaded by NGOs at City level, and boroughs through food action alliances. The food alliances are networks of non-state and non-industry providers, involving a range of activities such as food banks, food growers, community kitchens – supermarkets- fridges. They connect with local government through their public health departments. As crisis hit, they quickly turned their energies to organising emergency food aid. Phenomenal efforts are being made to scale up to meet increased demands. However, they face barriers. For example, many TSOs are involved in competitive processes to win and maintain local government contracts. Funding is often short term; a precarious situation for TSOs. In this crisis they need to collect evidence for ‘sustainability’, that is, to secure future funding.

    Despite the existence of resilience structures at regional and borough levels, strategies to meet increased food needs were not apparent. Indeed, there was little national food strategy (Lang, 2020). In London, as the crisis unfolded new charitable funding streams emerged. Four weeks into the crisis, the owner of London’s free newspaper, Evening Standard, and son of Russian oligarch intervened to feed ‘vulnerable’ Londoners through a new charitable alliance. This centralises food surplus supplies and distribution across boroughs. This role of charities is legitimised by London’s Mayor, albeit likely unintentionally. This upscaling of charities to deliver such large-scale logistical challenges raises concerns about the future direction for PHN.

    Altruism continues with the emergence of new food banks, food project social entrepreneurs and the Mutual Aids. With roots in 19th Century social welfare based on fraternalism not paternalism, these are today on the one hand wonderful, inspiring acts of solidarity but what will they become? There are many questions to consider: Do they adopt a public health perspective that considers inequalities including class and ethnicity or are these individual acts of charity and kindness? What is the class composition of the Mutual Aids? Will there be unintended consequences? Within communities, will they bridge or increase class divides and inequalities? Do they provide uniform and equitable support?  Do they contribute to food democracy within our communities? How are they accountable?

    These and other new solidarity networks enter into the terrain of unevenly shared and disjointed public health resources. Across London, a postcode lottery in public health nutrition pre-dates this Covid crisis. For example, eligibility for free school meals depends on the political priorities of local councils as well as government policy. Universal free school meals (UFSM) for all primary age children are provided in only 4 of the 33 boroughs. This includes children in families with no recourse to public funds (NRPF). Their temporary access to FSM during this crisis will be withdrawn as schools reopen. A cruel, intentional political act belonging to the ideology of hostile environment; socially divisive among young children teaching them that ‘others’ are undeserving and go hungry. What will Labour councils do when the onus for feeding children with NRPF returns to them?

    The differences between and within boroughs is seen at the level of schools. Schools take different approaches with some providing food for all children in-need and others based on FSM eligibility. Seven weeks since its introduction, the government’s voucher scheme that replaced FSM continues to be problematic, adding to the suffering of families; some schools are bypassing with their own voucher systems. Schools are filling the gaps but cannot do so as a cross-borough strategic approach due to privatisation. In contrast to London, New York took a pan-city approach with 400 public schools providing food for all adults and children in-need.

    Despite incredible efforts, TSOs, have made it clear they cannot fulfil the function to feed ALL in need:    ‘There is not enough free food or volunteer capacity to feed all economically vulnerable people through local authority and charitable means’. Instead they argue that central government should provide the financial means to enable everyone to buy food that meets their nutritional and cultural needs. From an ethical view it is irresponsible that central government assigns responsibility to local authorities and TSOs without giving the resources to carry out responsibility. It is well established that emergency food aid systems need to be nationally co-ordinated strategies. The UK government’s use of the armed forces for food distribution to the 1.5 million shielded clinically extremely vulnerable people, is recognition of the level of strategic organisation that is needed. It shows that only central government has the resources and therefore responsibility to feed ALL people in-need, across all vulnerabilities. It is not possible for this to be a function of TSOs. How do TSOs and local government decide ‘vulnerability’ without interlocking socially divisive ideas of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor? These are political decisions. Solving hunger takes political will (Caraher and Furey, 2018).

     

    The politics of privatisation and charitisation are felt most strongly on the frontline by the community food activists some engaged for decades in fighting to hold their communities together. One such leading activist and mother, Maya in South London, said

    I’m tired of fighting, fighting, fighting”. Yet she remains on the frontline running the local food bank/social supermarket. She says: diets will slump in areas like this … people use social supermarket but can’t get the foods children want … fresh fruits and vegetables have short shelf life ..we have to respond to new issues that come along …the hidden people that now come out who are in extreme poverty. While caring for her community she comments on new oppression by powerful borough groups and lack of accountability: people are going crazy with this food thing … there’s a lot of money around food …all they want to do is help the ‘poor’ people … they’re doing deliveries, taking selfies and putting it on twitter …  some people are stepping on our heads… others are cashing in on it.” On a part-time London living wage, she finds her own living standards are slipping backwards.

    What will emerge from this crisis? Local authorities will soon be planning their recovery processes. With depleted and finite funds will we see a redefining of ‘vulnerable’; a new means testing for referrals to emergency food aid? We are facing a long recession/depression with increased food poverty, malnutrition and hunger. This is potentially on an unprecedented scale. How will the increased charitisation together with ongoing cuts impact the public health infrastructure and jobs? Who will be providing food for public health? These are important questions for all of us in PHN whether Director of Public Health or unpaid community food bank worker. How we tackle feeding EVERYONE in-need is not just a practical question but a basic ethical one concerning food rights and health equity that requires reconnecting with our communities and schools for grassroots participation in decision-making. Enabling participation requires tackling the material conditions, of work and physical food environments, that underpin health inequalities.

    A weak public health nutrition infrastructure, including diminished community services, contributes to undernutrition, reduced immunity, more illness, more hospital visits. Pre-Covid estimates showed  £200 million could be saved in health and social care spend if greater attention is paid to caring for the nutritional status of vulnerable adults. This would contribute to the inequality seen in the distribution of Covid-19 death rates. Our right to nutritious food is essential to enable our rights to good health and longevity free from illness. To make this a reality, for all, will require fiscal measures that guarantee universal basic living income, that integrates food costs, as well as massive investment in communities and public health nutrition. One among many lessons for how we plan for food and health resilience in times of crisis, is to meaningfully, democratically involve our communities and workforces on the ground.

    Sharon Noonan-Gunning, Registered Dietitian, PhD in Food Policy.

    Caraher M., Furey, S. (2018) The Economics of Emergency Food Aid Provision: A Financial, Social and Cultural Perspective. Palgrave Macmillan. London.

    Lang, T (2020) Feeding Britain: Our Food Problems and How to Fix Them. Pelican Books.

    Comments Off on Covid-19: food and health inequalities and the future of public health nutrition

    Summary

    The current National Health and Care System has shown the fact that a system can run on the basis of an ethic of altruism and public service, not profit.

    The hospitals have always held primacy in our system, and reorganisations have tried to rebalance the system in favour of community health and primary care.

    Public Health has been weakened by the 2012 Act and enjoyed more prominence during the period of Primary Care Trusts when it was integrated with Primary Care. This situation needs to be restored

    Health and Care need to be integrated regionally and the paper argues for Combined Authorities to be given overall control.

     

    No, the title was not a typo. There is more to healthcare than the NHS which we all know and love. Health Care includes Public Health, Social Care, Pharmacy and Dentistry, and they all need to work together. The present crisis has shown this. This is something which many experts in the field have acknowledged for years; doing something about it has proved elusive and difficult. This present crisis has shown not only the heroic dedication and commitment of the staff, but also the gaps and problems which need to be rectified, so perhaps this is the time to try and do it.

    In this paper I have tried to set out some sort of roadmap of the problems we need to tackle. That is why I have called the objective a National Health System, rather than the current NHS, but have preserved the iconic brand which is known all over the world. I once met mountaineers in a foreign land who praised the NHS.

    I am not an academic. I have taught about how the Health System works, but more practically I have been a councillor, worked for the NHS, served on a Clinical Commissioning Group and now Health Education England. I wrote a book about how the NHS should be organised with Sunderland University, and I will draw on bits of that in this paper, but my knowledge comes mainly from my practical experience. (“What Sort of NHS do We Want?”, Searching Finance, 2012)

    How we arrived at the present position

    There is much ignorance amongst the public as to how the NHS actually works. It is certainly very fragmented, but still able to respond as a national system, which has been shown by the present crisis. Many fondly think there was a “golden age” back in the 1950’s when the NHS was first established.  Aneurin Bevan boasted of a national system where the “sound of a bedpan dropped in Tredegar would reverberate around the Palace of Westminster”.

    We all know establishing the NHS was a political struggle and what emerged was a messy compromise. The immediate problem was sorting out hospitals which needed investment after the war. I can remember seeing pictures of my Grandmother, who was a hospital almoner, lining up the nurses to go out with the collection tins. Hospitals seem to have dominated ever since although they deal with a minority of the people who use the system. There are more patient contacts with GPs, carers, Public Health programmes ,  and Social Workers. Local Government had played an important role in health before 1948, and Directors of Public Health were important people. Much of what we would now call primary care was still run by local authorities up until the major reorganisation of 1974.  Strong central control was the way things worked in 1948, a legacy of the war – the NCB, British Railways, The National Grid and even the New Towns. The new NHS was no different.

    Initially Governments thought that a strong NHS would improve health and once the backlog of bad health had been dealt with, costs would reduce. This of course did not happen, so managing the NHS became a constant struggle between improving the service and keeping a lid on costs. In 1974 all health services came under Regional Health Authorities and this remained until the next major reorganisations at the end of Thatcher’s period in power. This was when the concept of the “market” was introduced into the NHS.

    At that time the model of the big top-down organisation was being challenged both in the public and private sphere. Although big organisations were still centrally controlled from the top, they wanted more flexibility locally to restructure and adapt to changing conditions at the bottom. Even the army now operates like this. The idea was that those who planned a service would commission it from who could provide it best. Commissioning meant what the service was going to be had to be evaluated and planned. The NHS had to think exactly want it wanted and the best, and most cost-effective way, of achieving it. This does not necessarily mean using the private sector. Other NHS and not for profit organisations are often involved. But it was never a free-for-all. The NHS was still in charge. Resulting from the Thatcher reforms there was a privatisation of many ancillary services such as cleaning, maintenance and catering. For clinical services there was still a preference to commission NHS and not for profit organisations. One consequence of these changes was that local authorities outsourced much of their social care provision, mainly for economic reasons.

    The Labour Governments after 1997 modified the model, introducing both Foundation Hospitals and Primary Care Trusts. In my opinion the PCTs were a very progressive reform, and one for which the Blair Governments, Frank Dobson and Alan Milburn received very little credit. They brought together Public and Community Health and allowed a high degree of local government involvement since they covered the same areas as local authorities and usually had councillors on their boards. Under the Blair Government resources were diverted to PCTS, and also prioritised deprived areas such as Easington in County Durham. There was a real push to reduce health inequalities. In my experience the PCTs also put a considerable amount of resource and effort into engaging with the public. In some ways this was a “golden age” for engagement, compared to the much less robust arrangements which replaced them.

    The Black Report in 1979 pointed out that despite large investment in the NHS, health inequalities persisted.  Professor Townsend, one of the main authors, mentioned Easington in a later report and visited Peterlee to explain his ideas. The dominance of the Hospitals in the system had led to a neglect of both social care and the promotion of health in the community. To reduce inequalities meant placing far more emphasis on how people lived, the conditions in which they lived and looking after them in the community when they were frail or unwell. Successive reports re-emphasised what the Black Report had said.

    The Primary Care Trusts were an attempt to redress the power balance with the hospitals. More resources were given to community and public health, which were now integrated. GPs had a major role. The PCTs were coterminous (horrible NHS word) with local authorities, and the Director of Public Health was now appointed jointly between the local authority and the PCT.  Cooperation was much easier. Many PCTs had councillors on their boards. The PCTs now had more power to negotiate with the hospitals to get better deals, and work with them. At this stage commissioning was mainly for other public sector and voluntary organisations. The NHS was the “preferred provider”.  The PCTs made considerable progress in improving public health, such as the reduction of smoking and teenage pregnancies, and set up many community initiatives.

    In my opinion the PCTs were a very progressive reform, and one for which the Blair Governments, Frank Dobson and Alan Milburn received very little credit. They brought together Public and Community Health and allowed a high degree of local government involvement since they covered the same areas as local authorities and usually had councillors on their boards. Under the Blair Government resources were diverted to PCTs, and deprived areas were prioritised. There was a real push to reduce health inequalities. In my experience the PCTs also put a considerable amount of resource and effort into engaging with the public. In some ways this was a “golden age” for engagement, compared to the much less robust arrangements which replaced them.

    I think I should make a few remarks about commissioning.  Many on the left regard it as synonymous with privatisation. This simply is not so.  As explained above the NHS is not monolithic and contains many different sections and specialities. Some of commissioning is straightforward – estimating the number of routine, predictable operations required in a year, like hip replacements. Then it is about negotiating the best deal with a provider.  But some is more complex, such as public and community health which requires constructing alliances between different organisations. Using a private provider is not a necessary part of this at all.

    All this was changed by the infamous Social Care Act of 2012 which established the Clinical Commissioning Groups. It compelled contracts to be put out for public tender, so private providers could apply, and often threatened to sue if they thought they had not been fairly considered.

    Councillors were not allowed to be involved, and their only oversight was through Scrutiny Committees. Public Health was handed back to local authorities. A strong national agency, Public Health England was created to exercise many of the responsibilities which PCTs had previously done including disaster planning and campaigns to reduce smoking and other habits deemed to be harmful to health. I will say more about the consequences of that later.

    The CCGs were a result of lobbying by a minority of GPs who wanted to commission directly without the NHS bureaucracy and pressure from private providers who wanted a bigger slice of the action. The Government thought they could use them to reduce costs. The whole enterprise was ill thought out and very disruptive. It is a useful lesson in the sort of “creative destruction” advocated by the likes of Dominic Cummings. The idea being that somehow once the bureaucratic shackles of the NHS and local government had been thrown off, GPs would somehow emerge as the heroes of the NHS and challenge the dominance of the Trusts. I can remember attending seminars before the new act was implemented where it was even advocated that two GPs could form a commissioning group. How they would work out the necessary plans and calculations was not thought about. I can remember a seminar about the changes entitled “Breaking Though”.

    In reality it was only a minority of GPs who wanted to run the NHS.  Most of them simply wanted to get on with their jobs which were demanding enough. Much of the pressure came from private providers, aided and abetted by members of the government anxious to reduce costs and eliminate, as they saw it, unnecessary bureaucracy.  Andrew Lansley, in many other ways a fairly level-headed man, seemed carried away by it all, and David Cameron and Nick Clegg did not really understand it. The only contribution by the Liberals was to ensure lay representation on the new CCGs. The reorganisation was described by one critic as “visible from space” and disrupted the NHS for several years.  Patterns of cooperation between agencies, carefully established over time were either disrupted or had to be carried on “under the radar” in the new competitive model. A new bureaucracy had to be established from the PCT staff to perform commissioning.

    One hospital (Hinchinbrooke) was taken over by a private company which could not cope and had to hand it back to the NHS.  Many private providers attempted to run the new 111 services, but now most of them are organised by Ambulance Trusts.

    The idea behind the 2012 Act was that there would be a free market. The CCGs would commission the most efficient service, public or private.  Collaboration, whether between hospitals and other parts of the NHS was not, in theory, allowed. Private providers could take the NHS to court if they thought the NHS had an unfair advantage. In practice, however, the national NHS kept a firm grip on things. There is always the need in the NHS to pool risk.  If there is an outbreak or crisis in one area the whole system has to pitch in.

    The 2012 Act led to an extremely costly and disruptive reorganisation. Many health professionals soon realised that it did not work. In reality the bureaucracy expanded, and much energy had to be expended negotiating between different parts of the NHS. The majority view was that if the NHS was going to cope, two things were necessary. Firstly, more resources needed to be directed to promoting good health, and thus reducing those diseases which were caused, or exacerbated, by a bad lifestyle, such as diabetes. Secondly an ageing population meant more people would need care in the community, rather than treatment in hospital. If they did not receive this care, then they would end up in hospital, as so called “bed blockers”.  Hopefully if policies to address these objectives could be put into place it would reduce unnecessary hospital admissions.

    Local health professionals have tried to negotiate arrangements for CCGs, Hospitals and Local Authorities to work together.  These were originally called Strategic Transformation Partnerships, abut have now morphed into Integrated Care Systems.

    Simon Stevens, Chief Executive of the NHS, said in the Five Year Forward View

    “The government will not impose how the NHS and local government deliver this. The ways local areas integrate will be different, and some parts of the country are already demonstrating different approaches, which reflect models the government supports, including: Accountable Care Organisations such as the one being formed in Northumberland, to create a single partnership responsible for meeting all health and social care needs; devolution deals with places such as Greater Manchester which is joining up health and social care across a large urban area; and Lead Commissioners such as the NHS in North East Lincolnshire which is spending all health and social care funding under a single local plan.”(Implementing the five Year Forward View 2017)

    More detailed plans for ICSs have been set out last year

    The NHS Long-Term Plan set the ambition that every part of the country should be an integrated care system by 2021. It encourages all organisations in each health and care system to join forces, so they are better able to improve the health of their populations and offer well-coordinated efficient services to those who need them.(The NHS, Designing Integrated Care Systems in England 2019)

    It is important to notice the word “Systems”. These ideas rely on different organisations working together. They do not pool budgets, and have no one accountable management, just committees who liaise.

    The trouble is all this is against the 2012 Act. Manchester eventually commissioned other NHS organisations to deliver its community health services, but was threatened with court cases from private providers. All that would have wasted a considerable amount of public money.

    The Conservative election manifesto recognised the system was not working in 2017 and proposed changes to the rules.  All this has since been forgotten about with the dominance of Brexit but will eventually have to be addressed.

    Some on the left see the ICS’ as some sort of conspiracy, implying that there is a secret plan to fragment the NHS and then sell off parts of it. Simon Stevens is often portrayed as being some sort of ogre who is using his American experience to somehow smuggle American health companies into this country.  Remember that health is largely organised on state lines in America, and the insurers who pay for much of it want single organisations whom they can work with. I think the reality is somewhat different. Many think Simon Stevens is a shrewd operator who managed to secure additional funding for the NHS.

    Ever since I have been involved with the NHS there have been efforts to join up health and social care at a community level, and to challenge the dominance of the hospital Trusts.  In the early 2000’s the former Sedgefield Borough Council worked with their Primary Care Trust and Durham County Council to effectively integrate services by putting social workers, district nurses and housing officers in the same room, and Easington PCT considered integrated care initiatives.  The Sedgefield initiative worked at a grassroots level because it did not involve redesigning systems.  As soon as you tried to set up a new structure people retreated into their bunkers.

    It is much easier to set up an integrated system in theory than in practice. One senior insider I spoke to recently said that negotiations to set up an integrated care system locally were not getting very far because of vested interests. Different organisations have different hierarchies and systems of accountability.  They are also keen to hang onto their budgets.  It looks like a solution will only be reached if the NHS imposes it, and they do not have much spare energy for that at the moment.

    I remember the days before local government was reorganised in Northumberland and Durham, and District and County Councils were merged into the present unitary ones. The Government asked councils to work out ways of working together. There were interminable liaison meetings between the different councils which got precisely nowhere, each one wanting to preserve its own interests. Eventually the Government imposed a solution.

    Insiders also tell me there is very little interest from councils in the new arrangements.  Although in practice working relationships between the local authority and the NHS in most areas are good, some councillors appear to prefer the scrutiny role than actually being responsible for the service.

    So overall I think the problem is not so much a conspiracy to carve up the NHS as some on the left seem to think, but rather getting our fragmented system to work together for the benefit of all of us.

     

    Where we are now

    Most people on the left believe in a publicly run health service, free at the point of use. They also value the dedication of the staff and think they should be better rewarded.

    Socialists also dislike privatisation.  There is a difference between having to use the private sector if nothing else is available and the obligation to put services out to tender regardless of whether they are functioning properly as happens now. Efforts to integrate services are also hampered if parts are privately owned, as private providers may not disclose their information and not cooperate. (I remember my efforts on the CCG to get Capita to produce its accounts to the Audit Committee for a service they provided.)

    Privatisation often results in poor staff conditions and pay.  I think nearly all Labour Party members would wish a future Labour Government to repeal the 2012 act and restore the NHS as the preferred provider.

    That is the easy part.  Now we get to the difficult issues of how we organise an integrated service in the future and ensure it is accountable. Let me stress now that I do not want another major reorganisation. Our NHS staff do not deserve that. Rather we must think about how what we have now can be made to work better.

    I have not said much about Social Care, either personal, which is delivered at home, or residential in care homes. It is widely accepted that the situation is at crisis point. The paper by Professor Paul Corrigan is an excellent starting point. A recent briefing by the Nuffield Trust emphasised the dimensions of it. (Nuffield Trust, Election Briefing Nov 2019.)  Here are a few statistics:

    We believe the scale of the workforce challenge has so far been underestimated: our new calculations show that just providing a basic package of care of one hour per day to older people with high needs would require approximately 50,000 additional home care workers now. To provide up to two hours would need around 90,000 extra workers. ( Then there is the question of where they would come from if Brexit is implemented)

     

    A decade of austerity has seen government funding for local authorities halve in real terms between 2010–11 and 2017–18,* which has led to councils tightening the eligibility criteria for care. It is known that there were 20,000 fewer older people receiving long-term social care services in 2017/18 than in 2015/16, but this is likely to understate the problem – estimates of unmet need go as high as 1.5 million.

    Constraints on public sector finances in recent years have meant that fees paid by councils to the organisations that provide home and residential care have been cut repeatedly. The predominant approach used for buying services from providers incentivises organisations to provide a bare minimum of services and nothing more. Some 75% of councils report that these organisations have either closed or handed back contracts in the last 6 months, creating enormous disruption and discontinuity for those receiving care.

    The problems of Care Homes have been highlighted by the current pandemic. There are roughly 11,300 care homes in the UK who look after 410,000 residents. Most of their income comes from fees paid by residents or their families, with a minority provided by local authorities.  In practice the private fees subsidise the public ones which are often insufficient to cover the costs of the residents. Sally Copley of the Alzheimers Society says “The whole system hasn’t been working properly for some time”.  Many staff are on zero hours contracts and staff shortages are endemic as Professor Corrigan pointed out. Staff are paid far less than they are worth and do not receive adequate training nor professional recognition.

    We all have formative experiences which make us socialists. One of mine was in a care home where a member of my family was a resident. I knew two married members of staff well. Both were dedicated to their work and the residents.  They were always cheerful.  I can remember them saying with great enthusiasm how they had saved up enough to take their young family to Great Yarmouth for a week in the summer.  Their work deserved far more reward than that. I though “something has to be done about this”.

    A proper care system would assess people on the basis of clinical need, not ability to pay.  At the moment there is continuing health care, provided by the NHS, which is free,  for those thought to have health issues, but domiciliary and residential care largely has to be paid for by the clients or their families except for the minority who benefit from a stringent means test. Dementia is not classified as a medical condition.  Many people feel this system is unfair. A senior commissioner I spoke to said she would rather commission “care” which would be provided by professionals trained by the NHS, rather than try and distinguish between continuing health care and social care.

    At the last election the Labour Party promised free personal care for those over 65, as in Scotland.  As the Nuffield Report points out this does not include assistance with cleaning and general supervision.

    One of the best assessments of the cost of integrating health and social care was done by Kate Barker and associates for the Kings Fund in 2014.  They looked carefully at what social care involves, and how it could be paid for. There are different levels of social care, and they conclude that the same principles should apply as to the NHS.  Afflictions can strike anyone, rich or poor, so care funding should come from the public purse. The costs of care and treatment should be publicly funded, although this might not include the actual “hotel charges” for residential care. The authors suggest various ways to raise the extra funding, such as means testing free TV licences, and requiring those (usually better off) who continue to work after the retirement age to pay national insurance.  There would of course be a need for those on higher incomes to pay more tax, possibly after the age of 40, and the Government should consider a wealth tax which in reality for most would be a tax on your home. There are various avoidance schemes and tax loopholes for the wealthy which could be closed.

    There would probably be agreement amongst socialists that health and social care should be integrated and paid for out of taxation, but it is no good thinking only the rich would have to pay.  Everyone would have to pay something.

    Finally, there is the issue of Public Health. Transferring it to local government has not been a success. The budget, supposedly ring fenced, has been diverted to other local government departments because of the squeeze on local authority finance, and last year some of the poorest authorities took a very big hit. Durham lost almost 40% of its public health funding. Yet even in its diminished state, The Centre for Health Economics at York has estimated that expenditure on Public Health is four times more effective in promoting health than that spent on the NHS. Simple common sense tells us that keeping people healthy is better than curing them once they are ill.

    Several distinguished epidemiologists, including Professor Allyson Pollock at Newcastle, have argued that the marginalisation of Public Health locally has severely reduced the country’s ability to deal with the coronavirus epidemic. Back in PCT days Public Health had the resources and plans to deal with disasters, often pooling risk with others.  Now that has been transferred to Public Health England, leaving local authority public health departments to deal mainly with schemes to keep people fit. Worthy enough, but nothing like the resources they used to have.   A regional public health response might have led to better testing and efforts to contain the virus. The Government’s response has been “one size fits all”. Restoration of the importance of Public Health and its reintegration with the NHS should be a major aim of policy.

     

    Policy Objectives

    Our policy objectives will be ambitious. We might need a five year, or even ten year forward view to coin a phrase.

    We seek an integrated National Health System, encompassing the National Health Service, Social Care, Public Health, with links to Pharmacy, which has a role in primary care, and Dentistry, which is not a totally public service although the NHS controls the training. But we do not want a major reorganisation again. Our dedicated health and care staff do not deserve that. What we want to do is give the present system more resources and steer it in the right direction. Repealing the 2012 Act would be a priority.

    We must ensure that particularly in social care staff are paid a decent wage and given proper access to training. The present system which relies on the minimum wage and zero-hour contracts must end.

    The first thing we know is that all this will cost more than it does now, although integration may produce some savings. A future Labour Government has to be honest about this. It is no good promising a few rich people will pay, as the public simply will not believe it. It is a good principle that everyone should contribute to something which is part of national solidarity, so all feel that it is theirs, but contributions have to be proportionate to the ability to pay.  A proper revaluation of properties, which is akin to a wealth tax, would raise money through the community charge to make a substantial contribution to social care.  An increase in National Insurance, earmarked for the NHS should be considered, provided that it became more progressive.

    Then we come to the whole issue of Governance.  Despite showing little enthusiasm, local government needs to be involved in the whole strategic planning of the NHS. But they must not see it as simply concerning their own territory, so to speak. The present structure of Foundation Trusts should stay, but Public Health and Commissioning Services should be reintegrated into Primary Care Trusts, in my opinion one of the most successful NHS organisations in its long history of restructuring. The PCTs would have oversight of Pharmacy and Dentistry. Many of the responsibilities transferred to Public Health England should be restored to the PCTs. Their boards should contain both professional and local government representation.

    There is a need for a regional dimension in all this.  When the Northumbria Trust reorganised its A&E provision to build a super emergency only hospital at Cramlington it did not consider the effect on major hospitals in Newcastle like the RVI. Patients in Hexham, for example would find it easier to go there than to Cramlington. This is just one example of where a regional perspective would have been useful.

    Local authorities’ power over social care providers need to be strengthened. At present there is a real mixture of providers, commercial companies, charities, cooperatives and individuals who provide personal care as a small business. There is a strong argument for integrating the private sector, which is virtually bankrupt anyway, into area trusts responsible to local authorities. Standards and remuneration need to be strengthened.

    Trying to merge different organisations would be very difficult and disruptive. The result could be some unwieldy bureaucracy which would be difficult to manage and slow to react to changing needs and priorities. Accountability should be pushed upwards. We need to have some sort of accountable umbrella which ensures that hospital trusts, PCTs (coterminous with local authorities) and Social Care, which is regulated by local authorities, all work together. There will always be oversight from NHS England, NHS Improvement, and the Care Quality Commission, but these bodies are mainly regulatory.  There needs to be a more local system of Governance and Oversight.

    Nationally the country is moving to a system of Combined Authorities which at present oversee economic development and transport.  Manchester has also had community health added to its powers. A combined authority does not take powers away from local authorities.It has power and oversight over services provided by other organisations. Its membership is delegated from existing councils, with a mayor if that is agreed. It would seem logical for a combined authority to exercise oversight over the Foundation Trusts, PCTs and Local Authority Care in its area and produce a plan to ensure they work together. The CCGs now cooperate to cover larger areas in any case. That way we preserve flexibility within the system without adding another layer of bureaucracy,and move towards the integrated National Health System we want.

    I want to end by stating that as socialists we owe a great deal to the NHS and Care Services. They are an example, much admired elsewhere, of how a publicly run system can be successful, and that duty and altruism more important motivators of human conduct as making a profit.  It is our duty to ensure it is funded and run properly.

    David Taylor-Gooby, author on the NHS and member of the Socialist Health Association

    May 2020
    1 Comment

    Issue: 98

    17 May 2020

    The UK Now Has the 4th Highest Covid-19 Death Rate in the World

    Deaths/Million of Population

    UK: 495

    Some countries which are much more densely populated than the UK have much lower Covid-19 deaths/million rates. These include Bangladesh (2), South Korea (5), India (2) and Israel (31). (Source Worldometer, 14 May 2020).

    Why has this happened? Who is responsible? Is new leadership now required in the UK?

    Covid-19 Care Commissioning/Purchasing/Supply Chaos

    Clinical Commissioning Groups, NHS Trusts, NHS England, Local Authorities, care homes and now DHSC/eBay are all purchasing Covid-19 supplies including PPE.

    Where is the control? Where is the order? Where is the leadership?

    On 1 May 2020, somewhat belatedly, The Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) apparently wrote to all NHS Trusts stopping them from purchasing supplies. This includes PPE. I’m sure NHS Trusts are not intentionally stupid. They have been buying PPE themselves because the DHSC/NHS England/CCGs were not commissioning/purchasing/supplying PPE!

    The latest supply channel is a joint venture between DHSC and the shopping and auction site eBay. The venture is very new and according to ’Health Service Journal – on 6 May 2020 had supplied just 400,000 PPE items to only 1,400 of the 58,000 UK care service suppliers.

    Ealing Council Leader Julian Bell is alleged to have announced in a Unite Zoom meeting on 12 May 2020 that Ealing Council had been successful in purchasing PPE for four West London Councils’ ‘local care services’. Following recognition of this, Councillor Bell said the Council would soon be the purchaser of all PPE for all London Councils’ local care services. All this seems quite odd when one considers that the vast proportion of care/nursing homes are privately owned. Shouldn’t the owners of the homes be expected to provide PPE for their staff? Surely the same logic applies to the vast proportion of domiciliary care staff who are employed by private companies – their employers should surely provide them with PPE, not Local Authorities.

    On 15 May 2020 ‘The Guardian’ reported on the shambles at the Government’s outsourced PPE depot run by Movianto. Apparently PPE equipment was being stored in a smoke damaged Merseyside warehouse found to contain asbestos. In late March 2020 the Government ordered Movianto to begin distribution of the £500 million PPE stock. However, because of poor management and staff sickness progress was slow, errors were made and as demand grew apparently it became chaotic. The army was called in to sort it out. It didn’t help that during this period the American parent company sold Movianto to a French company. Questions are being asked as to why DHL lost the contract in 2018 and why Movianto, a loss making company for every year since 2010, had managed to win the £10.5 million/year contract.

    Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) Claim Government’s Approach to Them for Covid-19 Has Been ‘Top-down, Uncommunicative and Controlling’

    There are apparently 42 LRF’s in England and Wales. They have been tasked by Government to respond to Covid-19. A review by Whitehall, revealed in ‘Municipal Journal’, is very critical of the Government. The leaked report cited withholding vital data and intelligence on the progress of Covid-19. Research was carried out by Nottingham Trent University for the C-19 Foresight Working Group – a cross-party Government committee.

    Local Resilience Forums – which most people have probably never heard of – were introduced in 2004 in the Civil Contingency Act to provide the means to those involved in preparedness to collaborate at a local level. There is just one LRF in London (serving 9 million residents!) and it’s based at the London Fire Brigade, London SE1.

    Will the Government Mishandle Covid-19 Local Testing/Contact Tracing/Isolation/Quarantining?

    Sadly this is likely.

    Public Health Professor Allyson Pollock at Newcastle University and a member of the King Independent SAGE team has on numerous occasions emphasised that the Covid-19 national epidemic is not homogeneous. It is in fact hundreds or thousands of local Covid-19 outbreaks that are active in this country – all at different stages of ‘diffusion’.

    The key to contact-tracing is local knowledge and meticulous research on the ground. This suggests using Local Authority resources, GPs and the myriad of volunteer groups which already exist in all towns and villages throughout England.

    Allegedly Government outsourcer Serco has assembled/is assembling 15,000 tracers (Call Centre staff?) and 3,000 clinical support staff (recent NHS retirees?). ‘Health Service Journal’ reported on 13 May 2020 that much of the national test centre data/results were not being shared with GPs and Local Authorities. Will Deloitte who run these national test centres hand this test data to Serco?

    Yet another ex-McKinsey & Co employee is joining the fray and in a top position too. Baroness Dido Harding has been appointed leader of the Government’s Covid-19 Test and Trace Taskforce.  Her stint at McKinseys was in the 1980s. However she became notorious for her performance when CEO of TalkTalk for seven years. Her handling of a cyber attack resulted in losses of £60 million, four million customer accounts allegedly hacked, and a loss of 95,000 customers.  Baroness Harding also seems to have kept her role as Chair of NHS Improvement. Maybe with the merger of NHS England and NHS Improvement (NHSI), the NHSI Chair’s role is effectively redundant.

    The Government’s (as yet unnamed) contact-tracing App is still on trial on the Isle of Wight. If it ‘fails’ – on ethical or technical grounds – the Apple/Google App, being used in Europe, is waiting in the wings. And, according to ‘The Times’ of 14 May 2020, there are 43 Covid-19 contact tracing Apps in use worldwide.

    National Audit Office (NAO) Describes £8.1 Billion NHS IT/Digital Transition Spending as Inadequate and Confused

    • 54% of NHS Trusts reported that their staff could not rely on digital records.

    • NAO recommends spending 5% of the total annual NHS budget on IT/digital transformation. NHS is spending 2%.

    • Interoperability between new and legacy systems, especially with repeated changes in national strategies has created a fragmented environment.

    • NHS management of digital transformation at a national level is confused.

    A New Post Covid-19 Healthcare Plan Being Hatched for London

    ‘Urgent Action: System Plans for London’ is the title of a 29 April 2020 leaked memo to the five London Integrated Care System (ICS) Chairs and Senior Responsible Officers (SROs). The author is Sir David Sloman, NHS London Regional Director.

    The memo asked all these bosses to rapidly review their ICS plans in terms of new Cocid-19 challenges and future care strategies. It also asks them to report against 12 expectations contained in a ‘Journey to a New NHS‘ paper along with a set of slides. They had to reply by 11 May 2020. Why the rush one wonders?

    The backdrop to all this is multifarious. Firstly in terms of previous plans we have at least the October 2019 ‘London Vision’, the January 2019 national ‘Long Term Plan’, and the November 2017 ‘London Care Devolution’, and the five London regional October 2016 ‘Sustainability & Transformation’ Plans. In terms of statutory significance the ICSs have no legitimacy at all. In fact in at least one London region (NHS North West London) its ICS will not be formally born until 1 April 2021. (In NHS NWL for example, the only statutory legitimacy lies with the eight CCGs. Ealing’s CCG is strangely quiet at the moment. The last we heard from the Collaboration of the 8 CCGS was that all but Hillingdon CCG were ‘partnering’ with other CCGs. No doubt they are all trying to reduce their combined 2018/19 annual ‘employee benefits’ of some £10 million).

    A bit more NHS NWL flavour here is also relevant. In May 2019 NHS NWL outlined there would be 8 ‘Place Teams’, 8 ‘Local Committees’ and 8 Integrated Care Parnerships (ICPs). One year on, one wonders what’s happened to plans for them? Or is planning and strategy a London-wide only approach now?

    It really does seem an age away in 2013 when NHS bosses were preaching about local commissioning, by local GPs with local knowledge. Their bible then was the 2012 Health & Social Care Act – which ominously is the existing legislation that is being blatantly ignored in spirit and possibly in actuality.   

    Now to the content of the memo. A quick glance at the 12 expectations:

    1. How are you going to deal with non-Covid-19 acute elective and non-elective work? In other words how are NHS Trusts going to carry out the jobs they are paid to do?
    2. A consolidation and strengthening of specialist services. Cancer, paediatrics, renal, cardiac and neurosurgery listed. Does this suggest mergers and closures?
    3. Increase web, telephone and video triage. Never mind the quality – it’s cheaper than actually having to travel from home and meet a patient in a clinical ’setting’.
    4. How will you separate emergency Covid-19 from emergency ‘other’. (Given that some emergency other patients are locked into the ‘stay at home’ paradigm and think NHS UCCs and A&E units are awash with the Covid-19 virus).
    5. Develop virtual by default Primary Care and Outpatients. See 3.
    6. Minimise inpatient length of stay and faster Delayed Transfer of Care. See NHS NWL ‘Shaping a Healthier Future’ case study – seven years and £1.3 billion spend made little progress on this minimalisation.
    7. Address health inequalities – see similar unmet aspirations like Climate Emergency and clean drinking water for all the 7.7 billion inhabitants in our world.
    8. Same expectation as in 2.
    9. Merge corporate support services and clinical support services. Cost savings here.
    10. A workforce plan. Good luck with that one. Too few doctors, nurses, consultants, mental health staff at all levels, and too few support staff. Too many commissioners.
    11. A plan to ‘join together’ NHS institutions and Local Authorities. With different business models, goals, budgets, culture, politics and a shared desire not to open up financial books to each other – little progress on this front visible over the last seven years. No mention of ‘Integrated Care Partnerships’.
    12. Public engagement including ‘deliberate’ forums (e.g. NHS NWL 4,000 EPIC hand-picked sounding board – which is an attempt at regularly polling a representative sample of the 2.4 million NWL patients).

    Revenue and capital cost estimates were asked for. A three phase implementation over 18 months was proposed. But the NHS never meets its timescale projections. A new bit of jargon emerged – ‘London Vision the Touchstone’…….

    The 32 London boroughs commission all London’s social care. However it’s clear from comments heard from the London Borough’s of Ealing and Hammersmith that they have not been asked to comment on these NHS ‘Systems Plans for London’. Yet another painful example of the long running disconnect between healthcare and social care.

    A final postscript on NHS London supremo Sir David Sloman. Google can’t find anything about his life prior to 2009. In 2017 he was admonished by the Government’s data protection agency for illegally giving details on 1.6 million patients to Google Deep Mind.

    Is the Care/Nursing Home Business Model Broken Beyond Repair?

    Most care/nursing homes in England are privately owned. There are 17,000 nursing and residential care homes in England housing 400,000 people (NHS England, 2019). A lot of homes are part of care groups both small (e.g. Abbey Healthcare) and large (e.g. Four Seasons). Some are run by charities (e.g. St David’s, Castlebar Hill, W5). Care is commissioned by Local Authorities (LAs). The homes are regulated by the Care Quality Commission (CQC). Each home has a contract with a local GP practice. Many GP practices are commissioned by NHS England (NHSE). Some GP practices (e.g. the 75 in Ealing) are commissioned by the local Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG). Where local CCGs have been replaced by regional Integrated Care Systems (ICSs) could it be that the succeeding ICS is the commissioner? For over two years now the Department of Health has had social care responsibilities – so the DHSC has overall responsibilities for care/nursing homes. The care/nursing home acronym soup or tangled spaghetti looks like LAs, CQC, GPs, NHSE, CCG, ICS, DHSC.

    ‘Reuter’s’ data analysis up to 1 May 2020 shows at least 20,000 excess deaths in care homes in England and Wales during the pandemic. Is it any wonder then that when the Covid-19 history books are written one of the most painful chapters will be on unnecessary care/nursing home deaths.

    Eric Leach

    Silver Voices

    1 Comment

    Death Rates in France

    Tony Cross, formerly of Radio France International (the French equivalent to the BBC World Service), reports from France in www.theravingreporter.com that the number of deaths per day (from all causes, and not just deaths in hospital) has declined from a high point of 600 a day at the beginning of April, to a lower rate than in the previous two years (see the yellow line, compared to the red and blue lines). This is probably due not only to the decline in Covid-19 deaths as a result of the lockdown, but also to the lower rate of road traffic accidents and lower air pollution from road and air traffic. The statistics come from INSEE, the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies.

    Deaths from Covid 19 in the Care Sector

    Meanwhile, in the UK, Ann Bannister, Secretary of Reclaim Social Care, has just posted death figures from the Office of National Statistics covering Care Homes and Domiciliary Care.

    From March 2nd to May 1st this year, there were 45,899 deaths of care home residents, 27.3% involving Covid-19. 72.2% of Covid-19 deaths of care home residents were in a care home when they died, and the rest had been transferred to hospital. This means that over 9,000 deaths were not included in the totals reported in the press, of all the deaths from the virus, because the press was reporting only hospital deaths.

    Covid-19 was the main cause of death of men in care homes who died during the same period, while Alzheimer’s and other forms of Dementia were the main cause of death in women living in care homes, with Covid-19 in second place. However, Dementia and Alzheimer’s were also the main pre-existing condition in deaths caused by Covid-19 in both sexes.

    The statistics for recipients of Domiciliary Care 10 April – 8 May 2020 show that 3,161 clients of care in their own homes died of Covid-19, which were 1990 more than the average over three years.

    Unison North West are planning a Social Care campaign video conference on 26 May. To register email nwepoc@unison.co.uk

    Comments Off on News from the Frontline 17.05.20.

    Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) deaths

    Three of the four NHS workers reported to have died from Covid-19 in Oxfordshire to date were from a BAME background.[1] The first ten doctors to die of Covid-19 infection were BAME, many of them born outside the UK. This situation among health workers[2] reflects the pattern for deaths in the general population – the ONS has just found that Black people in the UK are four times more likely to die from Covid-19 than White people[3] –  as well as for deaths among people working in the NHS (including outsourced workers) and, probably, care workers.[4]

    Health and economic inequality sustained by structural racism, and exacerbated by austerity and privatisation of the welfare state, is the cause. The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the extreme racial and class inequalities in the UK.[5]  Michael Marmot’s recent Ten-Year Review of inequalities highlights straightened circumstances and poor life chances, and moves away from focusing on the behaviour of individuals. Marmot and the UN Special Rapporteur on Racism remind us of the austerity context within which the current pandemic is taking place, with the UN Rapporteur stating that ‘austerity measures in the United Kingdom are reinforcing racial subordination.’[6]

    NHS England and Public Health England and their leaders must be held to account.[7] The current inquiry to be led by the very bodies being investigated is not adequate. We must hold the Government to account for running down the public sector and undermining the NHS and its capacity to deal with pandemic, for its response to the pandemic, and for exploiting the situation to further privatise the NHS.[8]

    An effective enquiry into Black, Asian and minority ethnic deaths must be based on serious analysis of the interlinked socioeconomic and structural factors that may be involved and an understanding that racism adversely affects health even when these factors are accounted for.

    The socioeconomic effects of racism include:

    Longstanding structural discrimination in employment:

    • Low paid, insecure work with an overrepresentation of BAME workers in health and social care and allocation to higher risk roles.[9]
    • The effects of racism persist amongst medics – and, though less research has been done on this, presumably amongst all workers in the health and care sectors – with the evidence that BAME doctors are much less likely to make complaints around safety due to a fear of recrimination.[10]
    • Frontline, ‘key worker’ roles which do not permit working from home, with relative poor access to limited PPE.
    • The gig economy, and in jobs in domestic work, cleaning, childcare, small retail and family businesses. The economic packages allow many in these groups to fall between the gaps and make shielding for high risk workers and their families impossible.
    • Poorly protected outsourced jobs often with low union membership: the true impact of the policy of privatisation of public services and utilities needs to be investigated. This investigation must cover employment and NHS trust practices, policies and guidelines around the health and safety of all workers on their sites, not just those in their direct employment.
    • The lack of clarity about what constitutes a ‘vulnerable’ worker who should be shielding further increases the risk of pressure on less favoured groups in the population.

    Structural discrimination in housing and access to healthcare with:

    • Relative overcrowding in housing compared with White households.
    • A high proportion of BAME communities in densely populated urban areas of deprivation with (per person) under resourced health and social care facilities and higher levels of air pollution.

    Factors relating to migration include:

    • Whether a person was born outside the UK: 53 of 64 BAME Covid-19 deaths among NHS staff in one study were of people born outside the UK.[11]
    • Immigration status: some overseas workers fear losing their jobs and may feel driven to accepting additional risks.

    Some continue to propose various biological explanations for the prevalence of BAME Covid-19 deaths. Such evidence must be robustly scrutinised and not allowed to distract the focus on the overwhelming socioeconomic causes and the urgent need to address structural racism.

    Action

    Urgent tasks

    The most urgent task is to reduce all deaths from COVID-19 through adequate provision of  personal protective equipment (PPE), workplace practices that minimise risk, and physical distancing. Workers have the right not to work in unsafe conditions and employers have the duty to ensure safe conditions. A working, effective system to trace infection routes must be part of any loosening of lockdown. Local public health teams must be restored to deliver this.[12] All the evidence so far points to the fact that centralised privatised solutions have failed us.

    Research

    A programme of research is urgent to clarify the main factors and provide the basis for new policy. Ethnicity must form part of data collected by health and care services.[13]

    Health and Safety Executive guidelines and definitions in analysing workplace deaths, and procedures for investigating workplace deaths, need to be strengthened to keep workers safe and protected. Currently NHS trusts are left to assess themselves – a clear conflict of interest.

    Beyond immediate tasks

    The government’s hypocrisy must be challenged. Boris Johnson’s government has promised to ‘level up’ areas where health has deteriorated. Oxfordshire County Council leader and chair of the Local Government Association’s community wellbeing board, Ian Hudspeth, called the Marmot report a wake-up call: ‘Councils want to work with government on closing this gap… . Sustainable, long-term investment in councils’ public health services is also needed.’[14] Just one week later, on 4 March, a majority of MPs voted not to call on the Government to end austerity, invest in public health, and implement the recommendations of the Marmot review.[15] Opposition parties must be unrelenting in denouncing this hypocrisy now.

    The Runnymede Trust’s proposal[16] to introduce the socioeconomic duty, making class an ‘equality ground’ should be supported. This would return to the situation before 2010 when Theresa May scrapped the legal requirement designed to make public bodies try to reduce inequalities caused by class disadvantage (the socioeconomic duty).[17] [18]

    Migrant workers are the lifeblood of our NHS, our care system and our society. The hostile environment must end now. That means granting indefinite leave to remain to all NHS and care workers and their families, and abolishing a) ‘no recourse to public funds’ barriers to health and other services, b) charging migrants for NHS treatment, c) charging migrants a health surcharge on top of their income tax, and shutting detention centres.

    Action is necessary to end health inequalities. The Marmot Review’s recommendations must be implemented with race as a ‘social determinant of health’ as put forward by the Runnymede Trust. Inadequate public health expenditure and ‘shrinking the state’ disproportionately affect poorer people including our BAME communities. More ‘austerity’ to ‘pay for’ the pandemic is not an option as austerity widens the health inequalities that lead to disproportionate BAME Covid-19 deaths.

    This briefing gives rise to a number of issues to be taken forward in national and local investigations which we will be pressing Trusts and Local Authorities to undertake.

    Oxfordshire Socialist Health Association Committee

    May 2020

    [1] Oscar King and Elbert Rico, porters, and Philomina Cherian, nurse, at the John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford, and Margaret Tapley at Witney Community Hospital.

    [2] https://www.hsj.co.uk/exclusive-deaths-of-nhs-staff-from-covid-19-analysed/7027471.article

    [3] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/07/black-people-four-times-more-likely-to-die-from-covid-19-ons-finds

    [4] ‘Death rate among black and Asian Brits is more than 2.5 TIMES higher than that of the white population, reveals stark analysis by Institute of Fiscal Studies’, Daily Mail, 1.5.20:

    https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8276097/Clear-disparity-ethnic-groups-Covid-19-deaths-IFS-study.html;

    Office of national Statistics: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/bulletins/deathsinvolvingcovid19bylocalareasanddeprivation/deathsoccurringbetween1marchand17april

    [5] https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/coronavirus-highlighting-extreme-racial-and-class-inequalities-–-let’s-vow-end-them

    [6] https://hjt-training.co.uk/un-special-rapporteur-criticises-hostile-environment-policy/

    [7] http://www.irr.org.uk/news/institutional-racism-in-the-nhs-intensifies-in-times-of-crisis/

    [8] https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/may/04/uk-government-using-crisis-to-transfer-nhs-duties-to-private-sector

    [9] https://metro.co.uk/2020/04/21/nhs-puts-pressure-ethnic-minority-staff-work-coronavirus-wards-12589058/

    [10] https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/apr/10/uk-coronavirus-deaths-bame-doctors-bma.

    The February issue of the British Medical Journal was devoted to the subject of racism in medicine:  https://www.bmj.com/racism-in-medicine

    [11] https://www.hsj.co.uk/exclusive-deaths-of-nhs-staff-from-covid-19-analysed/7027471.article

    [12] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/26/to-tackle-this-virus-local-public-health-teams-need-to-take-back-control

    [13] ‘Ethnicity and COVID-19: an urgent public health research priority’, Lancet: https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2820%2930922-3

    [14] https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/feb/24/austerity-blamed-for-life-expectancy-stalling-for-first-time-in-century

    [15] https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2020-03-04d.903.0

    [16] https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/We%20Are%20Ghosts.pdf

    [17] https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/We%20Are%20Ghosts.pdf

    [18] https://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/nov/17/theresa-may-scraps-legal-requirement-inequality

    Comments Off on Covid-19 and BAME deaths: A call for action

    Introduction

    The SHA has produced a weekly Blog on the Covid-19 pandemic for the past 2 months. In these Blogs we have looked at many issues but the overriding finding is that the UK Government has been much too slow in responding to the pandemic, which has cost lives, stressed the NHS and severely damaged the economy. We are now one of the countries in Western Europe with the worst outcome in terms of reported deaths and deaths/million population.

    This is a scandal, and as we have learned more about the background to the response we learnt about the emergency scenario planning exercise in 2016 Operation Cygnus (Swan flu). This exercise, which involved the devolved nations and over 900 participants, made recommendations on the need for more PPE to be stored, more ITU ventilators to be procured for an enhanced ITU provision and robust planning for the social care sector which was at risk of being overwhelmed. The recommendations seem to have been largely ignored by the Tory government during its declared policy of disinvesting in the public sector and the policies of economic austerity. At that time Boris Johnson was a senior Cabinet Minister as Foreign Secretary and Jeremy Hunt, now Chair of the Health Select Committee, was Secretary of State for Health and Social Care. Who will take responsibility for not acting on the advice?

    The other issue that has become even more obvious is that public services such as the NHS have been starved of resources over the 10 years of austerity and while the service has made an extraordinary response to the pandemic it is against the background of poor capital investment and major staffing pressures such as medical and nurse staff vacancy levels. Similarly the Local Government sector has been pared down during the Tory years with massive disinvestment, floating State Education to unaccountable Academies and Free Schools, and running down many of its former functions including environmental health and trading standards. Local Authorities who have been driven to cut services and their budgets year on year are now being asked to stand up and take responsibility in an emergency while also trying to cope with the social care scandal. It sticks in the throat to hear government Ministers speak appreciatively about public sector workers, often in low paid jobs, who they have in the past criticised as a burden on the taxpayer.

    In this week’s blog we want to raise the issues about re-building the public health system so it can run the test, trace and isolate campaign from neighbourhood, local authority population, region, nation and central government. We are also concerned about the evidence of further privatisation using the Covid Trojan Horses and the excellent examples from other countries about how they have handled the pandemic successfully and published coherent plans to get out of their lockdowns.

    Test, track and trace, and isolate

    Since the beginning of the pandemic we have been calling for Covid-19 to be contained by using tried and tested public health measures of communicable disease control. Even without access to swab testing of suspected cases local public health workers would be able to establish whether someone was a suspected or probable case from taking the history of their illness. With swab testing this would convert the suspected/probable case to become a confirmed case and the local public health team would build their information base and start to map out the spread of the infection in their locality. Notifiable disease works in this way and at the start of the pandemic this could have been done in all areas. Contact tracing and recording demographic details as well as presenting symptoms would have built up a local picture of the manifestations of the infection, the demographic details and travel histories involved.

    A history of fever and continuous dry cough would have been sufficient to be a suspected case. It was a serious error to not start contact tracing and local notification in all areas to build up the knowledge and skills of local PH teams. Obviously when community spread became overwhelming such detailed work on contact tracing might reduce but a local record of test positive cases should have continued to be built us. Laboratory test results are still collected but this should have fed into the local teams databases. The variation in new cases and deaths across the UK has been very marked and in some areas this task would have been comparatively easy to sustain and in the process train new people under the watchful eye of experienced Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) supported by their Local Authority based public health colleagues.  Expert advice obtained from Laboratories and Public Health England would support the local teams under the leadership of Directors of Public Health (DsPH). Similar networks exist in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

    The reason for spelling this out at this stage of the pandemic is that at long last the government have rumbled that testing, tracing and isolating is part of the strategy to get out of the blunt tool of total societal lockdown. South Korea’s success was wholly dependent onrigorous testing including basic approaches being supplemented by mobile phone data and other digital systems. They have shown how they can monitor community infections and step in quickly to contain new cases as they arise. They did not have to resort to society lockdown and their economy has continued to function – as well as coping with voting in a general election during this time.

    To get testing scaled-up from its hospital base, the government has defaulted to their prior preferences and have turned to their friends in the private sector: Deloittes, Serco, G4S and Sodexo.  Rather than building local public health teams in Local Government and enhancing PHE reach from their regional organisations, we now have a mix of inexperienced private contractors. So rather than start the process of using the pandemic to re-establish public health capacity locally and regionally we see short-term contracts with the private sector. These private contractors are advertising for contact tracers at £8.72/hr. Sodexo, which is running many of the Covid-19 drive-through testing centres with minimal staff with clinical experience, are paying testers £13.50 /hr and trainers £17.50 /hr and all jobs are offered on a casual basis.

    These political decisions have already led to communication problems with poor reporting back to primary care and PHE, and who knows how, or whether, the data will be integrated into the system in a consistent and reliable way? To everyone’s astonishment, pop-up testing pods appear in local areas without anyone knowing that they were planned, and samples then have to be sent to the USA (yes the USA) to be tested when really results should be back quickly, and within 2 days to be useful. This is a huge lost opportunity to try and re-establish public sector public health services from local to regional levels and so build system resilience and independence rather than inexperienced private sector for profit organisations.

    Privatisation – the Trojan Horses

    The privatisation of the testing services is also being matched by the opening up of NHS data and information systems. NHS England and NHS Improvement (NHSE & I) (now merged in practice, though without the necessary legislation) is creating a data store to bring multiple data sources together including data from NHS111 calls, NHS digital and Covid-19 test results, and NHS and Social Care data. We are told that NHS data will remain under NHS England and NHS Improvement’s control!

    This data is very operational looks at occupancy levels in hospitals, capacity in A&E departments and statistics about length of stay of Covid-19 patients. The dashboard will provide a public health overview and supply operational data across the NHS. The partners in this include private sector multinationals  Microsoft, Palantir Technologies UK, Amazon Web Services (AWS), Faculty (an AI company), and Google. We are told that data and information governance will be strictly controlled.

    Apart from the private sector “entrism” into NHS data and information, we have seen KPMG being commissioned to build the Nightingale warehouse hospitals, which are having to be redesigned or mothballed. The NHS was only able to stand up to the extreme pressure through the dedication, commitment of health workers and their administrative and management staff embued with public service ethos. Another private sector stablemate, Deloittes, was handed the contract to provide PPE and to commission vaccine development. All this without the need for tendering.

    The risk that derives from the 2012 Lansley Act, the 2015 NHS guidance in England and the more recent Coronavirus Act, is that it eases privatisation of our NHS. And privatisation with even more stealth than that recommended by Nicholas Ridley’s Tory Research Dept proposals  to Margaret Thatcher in 1977, before she even became Prime Minister. Much commissioning of NHS services now takes place at national levels with very little if any scrutiny from publicly accountable local Boards. All these changes, brought in by the Tory Government before the pandemic, are now being used to privatise services and potentially set up the NHS for deeper intrusions into its role as a publicly funded and delivered health service.

    Exit out of lockdown

    Although some countries such as Korea and Sweden have avoided lockdown, many others  have had to use this blunt but too often necessary strategy. We are now seeing that countries that acted early and fast with containment measures, are planning the steps needed to safely reduce the constraints on everyday life and the economy.

    We have seen an excellent visual map of the five stages to be taken between May-August in the Irish Republic, which has so far been doing extraordinarily well in containing the infection with relatively few cases or deaths. New Zealand, which has been a beacon to other countries, seems to have succeeded with their policy of eliminating the virus. Under the excellent leadership of Jacinda Ardern, they too have set out their plan for freeing up movement of people and the economy. Neighbouring Australia have also done well with their policy on restricting air travel and quarantining arrivals, closing State borders and undertaking lockdown. They have only had 92 recorded deaths in their 25 million population and now have their staged plan published. No doubt we will be able to watch international sporting contests between NZ and Australia inside their Anzac bubble!

    On the European mainland Italy and Spain are taking their first cautious steps out of lockdown, which in their cases have pulled back the out-of-control spread. France has colour coded their regions and the red areas will remain under tougher conditions, but the South and West will see greater relaxation of controls. All these countries have published clear plans with criteria in easily understood diagrams of each phase and steps clearly laid out.

    The UK government has so far failed to set out the plan clearly and is at risk of confusing people by changing the message from “Stay at Home” to “Stay Alert”! They risk division across the devolved nations of the UK and misunderstandings about any new freedoms. Workers will need proper risk assessments of their workplaces before returning safely to work and this must include considerations about their journey to work, canteen and welfare facilities in the workplace, and that they that meet the standards of social/physical distancing and PPE provision where required. This will take time and many partners such as Trade Unions will need to be involved in aspects of the risk assessment in the workplace as well as facilitating transport to work.

    Conclusion

    We are at a critical point in the pandemic where we are still suffering from a comparatively high level of new cases being identified, with the social care sector suffering from particularly serious epidemic spread, risking the lives of thousands of very vulnerable residents. The government has rather belatedly recognised the WHO advice to test, test, test, and has successfully increased testing capacity but has failed to invest either in rebuilding the capacity of local public health teams in Local Government or in more local Public Health England teams.  In its struggle to get on with the response it is choosing to invest in private companies who have over the past decade already profited from NHS contracts in support services and laboratories, but now seem to have been also given access to NHS data. There is a serious risk of even further and deeper privatisation of NHS provision while publicly extolling the virtues of the NHS. And possibly the opportunity of using the data to try and sell private health insurance directly to individuals , or advertise private services in many more areas currently covered by the NHS. Finally, exiting lockdown will not be easy to achieve, as the epidemic has not declined in a persuasive manner, with the first wave suppressed and therefore prolonged. What people need is a clear staged plan for the steps to be taken and the data that will monitor progress rather than a statement of intent.

    As cardiologist Dr Banerjee notes in the Observer: “We were not humble enough to look at other countries and learn a lesson from them and lock down quickly – it is as simple as that. We were arrogant and thought that we had nothing to learn from other countries and thought that we were an exceptional case. In fact we had a lot to learn but didn’t take the opportunity”

    11.5.2020

    Posted by Jean Smith on behalf of the Officers and the Vice Chairs of the SHA.

    Comments Off on SHA COVID-19 Blog 9

    The UK has been in lockdown since March 23rd 2020 in an attempt to slow down the spread of the Covid 19 virus. Six weeks on the number of new cases per day has begun to decrease and government and business are clamouring to restart the UK economy. We believe that people’s health should come before profit and that there should be no return to work until it is safe to do so.

    The UK has the highest death toll from Covid 19 in Europe and the data does not to support that it is yet safe to relax physical distancing.

    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/05/uk-coronavirus-death-toll-rises-above-32000-to-highest-in-europe

    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/02/coronavirus-uk-how-many-confirmed-cases-are-there-in-my-area

    We may have reached the peak but there were still nearly five thousand new cases diagnosed on 3rd May 2020 and because access to testing has been so poor it is impossible to know how many other people in the community are infectious.

    We cannot undertake any meaningful planning for an exit strategy from the current lockdown without an understanding of COVID-19’s prevalence and our current levels of immunity.

    On April 2nd Health Secretary Matt Hancock promised to test 100,000 people daily by the end of the month. The government claim to have reached their target though there are allegations that the tally was artificially boosted.

    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/01/ministers-accused-of-changing-covid-19-test-tally-to-hit-100000-goal

    Testing must be safe, freely available and reliable and must be accompanied by rigorous contact tracing.

    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/29/uk-turned-down-offer-of-10000-coronavirus-tests-a-day-four-weeks-ago

    True prevalence is proving hard to predict. Where one study suggests 75% of people infected may be asymptomatic, another reports a very low rate of current infection – less than 1% of the tested population.

    The only way out of this is to gather data and learn the truth.

    Epidemiological studies of appropriately sized, randomised cohorts repeated every few weeks would chart the progress of the disease.

    Cuts to Public Health have made it virtually impossible to mount coordinated local responses to Covid 19 with testing, isolating and contact tracing. Restoring and updating local communicable disease control is an integral part of properly funded, publicly provided health and social care.

    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/26/to-tackle-this-virus-local-public-health-teams-need-to-take-back-control

    The lack of appropriate PPE is an ongoing problem in public facing jobs and this will only be exacerbated as more people return to work. Industry must be immediately repurposed to produce appropriate PPE in sufficient quantities.

    If people are to return to work it must be safe for them to do so, including their commute.

    Each workplace should undergo appropriate risk assessment to prevent unnecessary transmission of the virus. We do not believe that the Government can be trusted to do this. Trade Unions must have oversight. For example it should be up to the education trade unions to determine whether it is safe to open schools and the criteria that will need to be met. Schools must not be seen by Government and business as convenient childcare to enable kickstarting the economy. We support the NEU’s demands that schools should only be opened when it is safe to do so.

    https://actionnetwork.org/forms/open-schools-when-it-is-safe/

    Covid 19 has highlighted the importance of a nationally coordinated, publicly provided health and social care service. The NHS has excelled itself in coping with the crisis whereas the largely privatised, for profit, care home sector, which has no central coordination, has been tragically unable to prevent Covid 19 from taking a huge toll on it’s residents.

    https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/369/bmj.m1465.full.pdf

    It is well known that there is a spike in morbidity and mortality from all causes when a pandemic hits and services focus on the crisis in hand.

    https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/369/bmj.m1607.full.pdf

    The private health sector must not be allowed to profit from this. The private sector should be requisitioned if they are needed to help to clear the backlog. Matt Hancock, Secretary of State for Health and Social Care promised “We’ll give the NHS whatever it needs and we’ll do whatever it takes.”

    https://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2020/march/covid-19-statement/

    The NHS needs investment to deal in house with the waiting lists inevitably generated by the crisis, and investment must be ongoing to preserve NHS resilience. One of the lessons from Covid 19, and most winter flu epidemics, is that the NHS cannot be run flat out all year round without headroom and spare capacity to cope with peaks in demand.

    New infrastructure, such as software for arranging work rotas, is increasingly outsourced to the private sector. This is unnecessary and could easily be managed within the NHS.

    Neither must health care be rationed to cope with the back log. We reject the blanket use of the term Procedures of Limited Clinical Value (POLCV). Patients care must be decided individually on clinical need and not restricted due to financial pressures.

    Deprived populations have very high death rates and the effects of societies’ response to Covid 19 disproportionately affects those from BAME communities, the poor and vulnerable.

    https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/may/01/covid-19-coronavirus-newham-london-uk-worst-affected-area

    The UK is one of the most unequal societies in the world, while the more affluent are able to isolate in comfortable homes with plenty of outside space the poorest often have to share beds and go without food, for them physical distancing is impossible. Many epidemiologists, including Sir Michael Marmot, have demonstrated that the more unequal a society is the less healthy it is for everyone, including the richest. The Health Foundation Report published only two months ago “ The Marmot review ten years on” is a damning indictment of Government policy.

    https://www.health.org.uk/publications/reports/the-marmot-review-10-years-on

    Many other commentators suggest ways to redress the imbalance, they have largely been ignored by the Tory Governments. We contend that if these measures had been introduced it would have been much easier to contain Covid 19. We demand that Marmot’s original recommendations to be fully implemented.

    http://www.instituteofhealthequity.org/resources-reports/fair-society-healthy-lives-the-marmot-review

    In conclusion we believe that people’s health must not be sacrificed in the interests of profits. There should be no return to work until it is safe to do so and ordinary people must not be made to pay for the crisis, there must be no return to austerity. The UK is a rich country and there is plenty of money in society to ensure that everyone’s needs are met. If the banks could be bailed out in 2008 the people can be supported properly now. A Green New Deal would help to provide a more sustainable economy and a Universal Basic Income would help orientate us towards a fairer society based on need not profit.

    In summary before lock down ends there must be:

    • Testing which is freely available with contact tracing which is rigorously followed up and restoration and updating of local communicable disease control as an integral part of properly funded, publicly provided health and social care.
    • Frequent epidemiological studies of appropriately sized, randomised community cohorts to determine the prevalence of Covid 19.
    • Appropriate PPE for all public facing workers.
    • Repurposing of industry to produce sufficient supply of appropriate PPE.
    • Universal Basic Income and a Green New Deal with an economy based on need not profit.
    • Trade Union oversight on the safety of return to a particular workplace and trade union control of the safety aspects such as physical distancing
    • No exploitation of the backlog in care by the private sector to boost their profits.
    • A comprehensive National Health and Social Care Service, publicly funded, publicly provided and free at the point of delivery for all in the UK with adequate investment and an end to outsourcing, privatisation and fragmentation.

    Posted by Jean Smith on behalf of Doctors in Unite 5.5.20

    2 Comments
    Proposals to create a new super NHS laboratory in the northwest by closing local sites while 200 biomedical scientists are busy testing for Covid-19 will create delays in processing samples, Unite, Britain and Ireland’s largest union, warned today (Thursday 7 May).
    Unite said the plans by Lancashire and South Cumbria Central Laboratories Partnership to merge the labs at Blackburn, Blackpool, Lancaster and Preston into one super lab at a yet–to-be identified site would mean delays in testing samples which would have a detrimental impact on the estimated 500,000 people the super lab would serve.
    Unite, which has 100,000 members in the health service, accused NHS bosses of using the coronavirus emergency to push through this already rejected merger plan ‘under the radar’ when other similar collaborations, such as at Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust, have postponed all further plans until the Covid-19 crisis has passed.
    Unite said the plans were ‘a stab in the back’ for the biomedical scientists currently working at full stretch to process lab samples, including those for Covid-19, who have not got the time to examine the plan.
    Merger plans for a super lab at Lancaster, covering the areas of five NHS trusts, were rejected last year as it would make the service too remote from local GPs and hospitals, and increase processing times from the current 24-to-48 hours.
    In a letter to the partnership, Unite regional officer Keith Hutson said: “Unite finds it totally unacceptable that during the Covid 19 crisis you have seized upon this opportunity to force through merger plans and exclude the participation of Unite, the main representative of laboratory workers for this project.
    “Unite calls upon this project to cease until the Covid-19 crisis has ended.  I can say that apart from the despicable manner the trusts have chosen to progress this matter, be aware that when it is appropriate Unite, if necessary, will move to immediately ballot its members for industrial action.”
    Commenting Keith Hutson added: “NHS bosses are using the pandemic to reintroduce this flawed plan under the radar which will increase the times for processing samples. Our members who have given their all during this crisis feel the deliberate lack of consultation is a stab in the back.
    “We are going to involve the region’s MPs in this campaign, including The Speaker Sir Lindsay Hoyle, MP for Chorley, as, in the long-term, we fear that any super lab could be ripe for being sold off to a profit-hungry healthcare company.
    “If one thing has become clear during the last two months, it is that the British public respect and deeply value the NHS and its staff – and don’t want to see it being salami-sliced and privatised.”
    Twitter: @unitetheunion Facebook: unitetheunion1 Web: unitetheunion.org
    Unite is Britain and Ireland’s largest union with members working across all sectors of the economy. The general secretary is Len McCluskey.

     

    3 Comments

    THE GOVERNMENT’S DUTY TO KEEP THE PUBLIC SAFE OUTSOURCED TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR

    HANCOCK INCREASES PRIVATISATION BY STEALTH

    On Monday, the news broke that contact tracking and tracing (the next stage in managing the pandemic) will be outsourced to the private sector in the form of at least two private call-centre operators, one of which is Serco. They are providing 15,000 or more staff who, after one day of training, will be given a script to follow in conversations with people who have been in contact with confirmed cases of Covid-19.

    Ministers have been using the pandemic as an excuse to by-pass “normal” procedures for awarding Government contracts which involve invitations to tender and have been awarding contracts to a string of private companies and management consultants with no open competition.

    Even these “normal procedures” are a way the Tories privatise the NHS – the way they first began to do it – by insisting services which had previously been provided in-house by NHS employees, be “put out to tender”. Which is how firms like Carillion which went bust in Jan 2018 leaving debts of £7 billion, G4S, ISS, Sodexo, Bouygues and others came to be the employers of hospital porters, cleaners and catering services. A privatisation process dating back to 1979 and the Thatcher government and including more recently the Private Finance Initiative supported by the Labour Government of Tony Blair, but accepted as a disastrous debt-generator by subsequent Labour leaders.

    The Government has proved itself totally inept at managing the health crisis caused by the Coronavirus. It ignored the findings of Exercise Cygnus in 2016 which forecast the need – in the event of a pandemic – for ventilators, PPE and all the equipment which the NHS now faces a dangerous shortage of. The Government did not want to spend the money. In fact it has been cutting the NHS to the bone instead.

    Worse than cutting the funding, it has also been cherry-picking lucrative bits of the NHS and offering them to private investors for private gain at the expense of service to patients.

    When Johnson said “The NHS saved my life”, voters may have concluded “the NHS is safe in his hands. The Government understands how important it is now.” They do, but ten years of deconstructing the national service, outsourcing and privatising have gathered momentum and still retain their ideological grip on this government with its zero experience of worry about where the rent is coming from, or the next meal. The NHS has been viewed by the Tories as a potential cash cow for private investors and their already-rich Tory-supporting friends and it still is as these contracts for testing and tracing illustrate.

    At the beginning of the Covid Crisis, the SHA said, as did most of the medical profession and its journals, a range of statisticians, forecasters, epidemiologists and other scientists, that the dismissive and over-confident decisions of Johnson and Trump were seriously ill-founded; that pursuing the idea of “Herd Immunity” would mean that the NHS would be overwhelmed, and that the Government should accept the hand of friendship from the EU and other countries which offered to share sourcing of needed equipment (despite the “we can do better on our own” series of snubs to the rest of Europe, emanating from the UK Tory Government since 2016).

    These commentators urged the adoption of effective measures.

    1. To slow down the spread so the emergency services could cope, hence the lockdown, though the UK Government was slow to introduce it compared to other countries.

     

    1. To test for the virus and trace the contacts of those infected, so the lockdown could be relaxed without a second wave of the epidemic. Again the UK Government was slow to implement this. SHA President and Prof. of Public Health, Allyson Pollock said that tasks including testing, contact tracing and purchasing should be handled through regional authorities rather than central government.

    This was delayed while a private sector plan was cobbled together presumably to pre-empt the NHS, local authorities and other public sector bodies being asked to do the same, though they have a greater range of contacts, experience and expertise in spite of the relentless down-grading of the public health infrastructure and the budgetary strangulation of local councils.

    1. This would give time for a longer-term solution, and the development of a vaccine to reduce the numbers likely to get Covid-19 again, or reduce its severity.

    Firms such as Serco, Mitie, Boots, Deloitte, KPMG, and a US “data-mining” group called Palantir, have already acquired the rights to manage Covid-19 drive-in test centres, the building of the Nightingale Hospitals, and the purchasing of PPE. Deloitte, for example, is a multinational “professional services network” and one of the largest accounting organisations in the world, managed to acquire a contract to advise the Government on PPE purchases a few weeks ago. It thus took more decision-making authority from the NHS and local authorities, and shifted more power from the frontline. “It’s a power grab”, said Rosie Cooper MP, and we must protest in the strongest possible terms.

    Deloitte has had a poor track record in delivering PPE to the front line since the pandemic began, and taking more decision-making from NHS managers and local authorities shifts power further from the frontline and money for services into private pockets  The tax-payer pays for declining service.

    The Guardian said that NHS Trusts have now been instructed by the DHSC to stop buying their own PPE and ventilators or high value equipment for more general use in hospitals such as mobile X-ray machines, CT scanners and ultrasound machines.

    The system of tracking and tracing will be enabled by an NHS app on smart phones that alerts people that they have been near someone known to have the virus, or if they come into contact with an infected person in the future. Calling it an “NHS app” is no doubt intended to reassure people who might not want to use a Serco or Deloitte app for fear of what might happen to data on where they have been and to whom they might have been close. However, most of the contact tracing work will be contracted out to Serco and at least one other private-sector firm.

    The app goes on trial on the Isle of Wight this week. Supporters of the SHA on the Island (currently busy in a cooperative project of people with sewing machines, recycling donated duvet covers and sheets into scrubs for the frontline) tell us that it went live yesterday with NHS and Council staff, and will reach the rest of the Island by Thursday.

    The Isle of Wight was chosen as an area relatively cut off from the rest of the country during the lockdown, so a good place to study the spread of a virus. Currently there are limited ferry services for lorries transporting food and medicine and for ambulances to transfer serious medical cases to Southampton or Portsmouth. In addition the population is older than the UK average and fewer people have smart phones, so if it works reasonably well in those circumstances it should work even better nationally, says Hancock.

    South Korea did not go into lockdown. It adopted a strategy of widespread tracing and mass testing. Take-up would have to be very extensive for this to work here. There will be resistance to detailed personal data being collected by a multinational company. David Blunkett tried to get us to all have ID cards after 9/11 and met strong opposition from civil rights lawyers, trade unions and, indeed, Tories.

    The government is using the pandemic to transfer key public health activities from the NHS and other state bodies to the private sector. In 1977, Nicholas Ridley wrote a pre-Thatcher plan for the Tory Research Department in which he outlined a strategy of “privatisation of the NHS by stealth”.  “Managing” Covid 19 presents a good opportunity for taking this  further, building on the destructive intent of the 2012 Health & Social Care Act enabling a Tory government to give even more taxpayers money to the private sector.

    Testing and tracing is to be given to the public limited company Serco and others as yet undisclosed, but likely to include the security services firm G4S. Serco became infamous   for having tagged thousands of criminals who either did not exist or were dead and “other botched government contracts”, reported The Financial Times in 2015. The chief executive is Rupert Soames, appointed to turn around the business (whose shares had dropped 50%) who in turn recruited Sir Roy Gardner as Chair and replaced almost the entire board.

    Now, Serco has been appointed by the Johnson Administration to perform public health tasks in England for which it has little experience and little credibility with the general public. This tells you all you need to know about the current Government. Forget all the PR post Covid survival thanks to the NHS and the protestations of undying love for it.

    The real values of the Government are revealed in this move to spread public largesse to its own, although it will rely on public support for the NHS to get people to allow data on their every movement to be collected by a spy on their phone

    The reason why the NHS gets such massive support is because the general public use it, see it first-hand, recognise its skill and, crucially, know – in some imprecise way – that it is “theirs”.  It exists to look after all who come to it for its skills, whether Prime Ministers,  homeless veterans, newly born babies, or those beyond cure but never beyond care. And free at the point of use.

    In contrast, however well run Serco might be, and however well it learns in three weeks what it has taken local government and the NHS decades to absorb, its first duty is to its share holders and the need to pay a dividend.   In this century it will never get the trust that the NHS acquired in the last. Trust and values matter, especially where using personal information and getting the co-operation of millions of the public is concerned. The Times  reported Grant Shapps, the Transport Secretary, as saying the Government would have to make downloading the app “a duty to the NHS”.

    Further, at a time when it is abundantly clear that the NHS, local government, and bits of the already part privatised social care system cannot continue with the pre-Covid-19 settlement, the Serco option is as old fashioned as it is unwise.

    This is one part of the Government’s plan that Labour has to expose and oppose. Now!

    Vivien Walsh & Tony Beddow

    Comments Off on News from the Frontline 06.05.20

    Scientists and health experts believe that the government should examine a range of new antiviral technologies while planning their lockdown exit strategy.

    They say that there are at least half a dozen such technologies and strategies that could be combined to help make any exit strategy more effective – and help avoid a second peak in Covid-19 infections and deaths.

    Potentially useful technologies include newly-developed anti-surface-contamination products, virucidal face masks, and new ultraviolet light and virus-detection ioniser systems.

    Health experts believe that plans should immediately be formulated to commission the manufacture and supply of a range of vital equipment that would be needed in order to deploy those technologies – some as part of an exit strategy and others to prevent a potential second pandemic wave later this year.

    “Each technology and strategy is capable of helping to reduce the transmission of coronavirus – but by deploying a range of them, as part of an integrated coordinated national anti-viral program, the impact would almost certainly be much greater,” said Professor Kevin Bampton, the chief executive of the British Occupational Hygiene Society, which represents 1,600 UK professionals involved in disease prevention and health security in factories, offices and other workplaces throughout Britain.

    The full report can be found published on the INDEPENDENT here

    Posted by Jean Smith with the permission of the author.

    2 Comments